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Abstract 
 
To speak of ‘Surveillance and the Global Turn to Authoritarianism’ presupposes a moment with little connection to that which has 
gone before, or places outside of North America and Europe. While Trump and Brexit inaugurate a consequential shift, even rupture, 
in the political terrain, we must not lose sight of places and peoples where American Wars—with European support—were waged 
in the decades preceding this ‘global turn’, nor the fate of these places today. We argue that the sustained transfer of sophisticated 
surveillance technologies, as part and parcel of both direct military assault and more expansive support for security states, has had 
lasting imperial effects outside imperial centres that reverberate today. We take our point of departure in Pakistan—the site of 
hundreds of drone bombardments under Obama, one of the top recipients of US military aid, and the largest known recipient of 
funding from the National Security Agency (NSA)—to argue that ‘global turns’ must not forget the rest of the world, and 
Surveillance Studies may have far to go before it fully addresses its Eurocentrism. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
We begin with some background on Pakistan. 
  
First, in the post-9/11 period, around 60,000 Pakistanis have been violently killed in insurgency attacks and 
counterinsurgency operations. The government often cites this number to bring attention to the cost in lives 
paid by Pakistan in the ‘War on Terror’. 
   
Secondly, half of those who have been killed have not been killed by militants. They have been killed by 
the Pakistani security state with the help of the American military: about 10 per cent, or 3,000, have been 
killed by American drones.
1
 Militancy remains a key source of violence within Pakistan, but it is certainly 
not the only one. 
 
Finally, the growth of the Pakistani security state and its surveillance capacity is closely entangled with the 
historical intervention of the United States, the support of its allies, and their geopolitical interests in the 
                                                      
1
 This is based on numbers from the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), and on numbers from the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism. These numbers are neither fully reliable nor do they give a full picture, but they are 
indicative of the layout of violence in Pakistan. We would like to thank Arif Naveed of the University of Cambridge 
for providing the numbers from PIPS. 
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region. The investment of USD 46 billion to build a corridor linking the southwestern Chinese province of 
Xinjiang to the Indian Ocean via Pakistan means that the gauntlet of foreign intervention will now be passed, 
albeit reluctantly, to China. 
  
Trump and Brexit may mark a consequential shift, even rupture, in the political terrain, but the facts above 
remind us that they were preceded by a decade-and-a-half long war that has marked places like Pakistan–
or, for that matter, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and Libya. The intensity and distribution of these markings—
or ‘imperial effects’—are not unitary across time and space and have yet to be fully unpacked. Yet, the 
breadth and depth of historical and sustained intervention by the US and its allies can easily be established 
in places like Pakistan. Here, direct military assaults through American drones have left 3,000 dead. 
American support for the Pakistan Army has been closely entangled with collusion to carry out military 
raids and operations within the borders of Pakistan, on Pakistanis. And, the sustained transfer of military 
technologies—among them sophisticated surveillance technologies—has led to a ballooning of the capacity 
of the security state. Without denying the agency of Pakistan or Pakistanis—a topic for another paper—we 
call for attention to these ‘imperial effects’. They indicate that debates on the ‘global turn to 
authoritarianism’ misses a crucial part of the story: that ‘technologies of authoritarianism’ have been 
actively nurtured in other places around the world by the very governments which are now witnessing a 
‘global turn’. In fact, the ‘global turn’ is a sign that the War on Terror is coming home. 
 
Imperial Effects: Surveillance and Security in Pakistan 
 
Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the Pakistani security state, through the Pakistan Army, has held 
power three times through coups. Every coup has enjoyed military and economic aid from the United 
States—a luxury not available to elected governments who witnessed a tapering off, if not total shut down, 
of aid after transition to democratic rule.
2
 It was not until 2008, with the toppling of the third military regime, 
that this pattern in US aid shifted. Total aid from 1947 until today totals more than USD 80 billion, and in 
the period between 2002 and 2009 military aid constituted at least 70 per cent of US assistance.
3
 It was only 
when an Enhanced Partnership Act for Pakistan (popularly known as the Kerry-Lugar Bill) was passed, that 
this number decreased slightly to around 60 per cent (Center for Global Development 2014). 
  
In the post-9/11 period, the transfer of sophisticated surveillance technologies have constituted an important 
part of this support. Traces of this transfer can be found in pieces of evidence reported by journalists and 
advocacy groups. From them, we know that Pakistan is the largest known recipient of NSA funds, receiving 
twice as much as the second-largest grantee, Jordan (Privacy International 2017). Pakistan is also an 
approved Third Party Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) partner.
4
 This means Pakistan enjoys access to 
‘advanced techniques’ if its state officials are ‘willing to do something politically risky’.
5
 It seems that this 
partnership results in Pakistan providing ‘unique access, regional analytical expertise, foreign language 
capabilities and/or I&W [Intelligence & Warning] support’ in return for ‘technical solutions (e.g. hardware, 
software) and/or access to related technology’.
6
 Pakistan has also cooperated with a slew of foreign 
companies like Alcatel (France), Atis (Germany), Ericsson (Sweden) and Huawei (China) to gain access to 
                                                      
2
 In some democratic eras, e.g. in the 1990s, American aid was reduced to zero according to numbers provided by 
The Guardian (2010). 
3
 See The Guardian (2010).  
4
 See Privacy International (2017). 
5
 See Privacy International (2017). 
6
 This information is from the 2009 document entitled, ‘What are We After With Our Third Party Relationships?—
And What Do They Want From Us, Generally Speaking?’ which consists of an interview with the Deputy Assistant 
for SIGINT Operations in the NSA’s Foreign Affairs Directorate (see Greenwald 2009). 
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interception technology for the purposes of surveillance. This includes the acquisition of an International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity or IMSI-catcher through a ‘temporary licence’ from the UK.
7
 
 
Just like military aid, the transfer of surveillance technologies has been closely entwined with the security 
agendas of American and European governments, and their allies. The complete details of this entanglement 
are hard to come by, but a 2009 cable from the US Embassy in Islamabad discovered by WikiLeaks reveals 
that it was extensive.
8
 The cable exposes that Pakistan and the US sought deeper cooperation around 
surveillance of Pakistanis as part of a quid pro quo. In return for cooperation agreements and surveillance 
technology transfers, the Government of Pakistan promised to send extensive information on its citizens 
from its National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) as well as lists of Advanced Passenger 
Information (API) and Passenger Name Records (PNRs) from flights leaving Pakistan. The enhancements 
sought by the Pakistanis included ‘adding voice and facial recognition capability’ and the installation of ‘a 
pilot biometric system at the Chaman border crossing [on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border], where 30,000 
to 35,000 people cross each day’. These systems have since been extended. In an interview with a Pakistani 
politician,
9 
Julian Assange revealed that ‘a front company was set up in the United Kingdom—International 
Identity Services, which was hired as the consultants for NADRA to squirrel out the NADRA data for all of 
Pakistan’ (News Desk 2017). Ironically, the Pakistan People’s Party or PPP, whose government were in 
negotiations with the Americans about transferred surveillance technologies, later discovered that they were 
themselves being surveilled by the United States (see Haider 2014). 
 
The recent shift of Pakistan into the orbit of Chinese influence marks the expansion of this surveillance and 
security state. We know that the plan for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, will include the 
development of a ‘full system of monitoring and surveillance in cities from Peshawar to Karachi, with 24 
hour video recordings on roads and busy marketplaces for law and order’.
10
 New fibreoptic cables will both 
secure ‘cultural transmission [...] for the dissemination of Chinese culture in Pakistan’—opening up Pakistan 
as a new potential market, and securing Chinese capital investment.
11 
Much work remains to be done on 
China’s ‘imperial presence’ in Pakistan, as well as on the intensity, extent, and form of this expansion. 
 
The evidence presented above is neither fully elaborated, nor does it show a complete picture of what is 
going on in Pakistan. However, this focus on the transfer of surveillance technology as part of a nexus of 
support for the security state in Pakistan alerts us to the danger of speaking of a ‘global turn to 
authoritarianism’ marked primarily by Trump and Brexit. There is certainly a Western jerk to the far right 
that is being solidified with new leaders and new laws, but it has been both preceded and foreshadowed by 
the rapid expansion of and Western support for ‘technologies of authoritarianism’ in countries like Pakistan. 
 
We are not saying that all transfers of surveillance technologies are pernicious—in fact, they have also been 
used to eradicate polio
12
 or fight epidemics
13
 in Pakistan. However, the sustained and long-term transfer of 
surveillance technologies, much of which is part and parcel of a more expansive support of the security 
state, has been deeply entangled with the national security priorities of North America and Europe—
especially the United States. It has also fed into the security interests of the Pakistani state. 
 
Therefore, one of the results of transferred surveillance technologies has been a rapid expansion of the 
capacity of the security state. This security state does not apply surveillance technologies equally. Instead, 
                                                      
7
 The IMSI-catcher is a telephone eavesdropping-device that intercepts mobile phone traffic and tracks location data 
of cellular phone users (see Cox 2017). 
8
 US Embassy (2009).  
9
 The cricketer-turned-politician, Imran Khan. 
10
 See Husain (2017). 
11
 See Husain (2017). 
12
 See Polio Global Eradication Initiative (2017). 
13
 See British High Commission Islamabad (2017). 
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as Deepa Kumar (in Kundnani and Kumar 2014) argues, surveillance tends to target marginalised, racialised, 
and dissident peoples and communities: such communities are more likely to be surveilled, arbitrarily 
arrested, deported, physically and mentally harassed, put into solitary confinement, sentenced for crimes, 
and suspected for their social relations and interactions (see Kundnani and Kumar 2014). 
 
Take the example of Pakistan’s ethnic Pashtun population: when a string of bombings by militants earlier 
this year left over a hundred people dead, Pashtuns from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas or FATA 
were the first to be targeted. FATA is a small sliver of territory bordering Afghanistan and has been a site 
of drone bombings, army operations, and militant attacks in the post-9/11 period, forcing its residents to 
flee. Seventy-three per cent of its residents live in Multi-Dimensional Poverty, and it has long been seen 
through the racialised lens of first the colonial and now the Pakistani state, with Churchill once calling them 
‘savages and barbarous’ (Churchill 1897). In the capital of Islamabad and its twin city of Rawalpindi alone 
5,400 Pashtuns from FATA were placed under strict surveillance as the government considered ‘issuing 
them chip-based national identity cards equipped with security features’ in the immediate aftermath of 
attacks earlier this year (see Asghar 2017). This sort of surveillance has aided mass killing of Pashtuns: of 
the 30,000 killed by the Pakistani and American states since 9/11, half of them have been killed in FATA, 
a Pashtun-majority territory.
14
 Other minorities—like Pakistan’s minority Baloch population—have faced 
similar levels of surveillance and harassment: particularly, members of its separatist uprising have been 
subject to disappearances, torture, kill-and-dumps, encounter killings and army operations.
15
 Tracking of 
political activists through mobile phone surveillance and informant networks has played a key role in army 
atrocities.
16
 
 
Or, take the example of Pakistani political organisers, activists, dissidents. Pakistan’s premier intelligence 
agency, the Inter Services Intelligence or ISI, has been given legal cover by the government to take action 
against those involved in ‘online crime’—effectively defined as those taking critical stances vis-a-vis the 
state—through a new act passed called the Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act, a law several online campaigners 
have criticised for its potential to shrink online spaces of debate and dissent.
17
 Social media surveillance of 
critics of state policies has resulted in a targeting of groups through infiltration, content monitoring, and 
interception, and has resulted in enforced disappearances, torture, arrests, interrogations and confiscation of 
digital devices of those summoned by authorities.
18
 More indirect methods to censor dissent have also been 
taken into use: Pakistan has banned YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and websites run by religious, ethnic and 
sexual minorities in part through the use of surveillance technologies that allow them to uncover the details 
of administrators and moderators.
19
 Through this regulation of online spaces, it has allowed some groups— 
for instance pro-army propagandists or far-right Islamist extremists active on social media—to enjoy more 
space than others, effectively allowing the former to violently challenge journalists, political workers, 
dissidents, and others from rivalling factions (Mehmood 2017). 
 
North American and European governments are certainly not engineering much of what is going on, but 
post-9/11 intervention by these governments in Pakistan has further expanded the capacity of the security 
state to carry out such targeting. In fact, Privacy International opens a 2015 report on Pakistan by noting 
that the ballooning of both the military’s defence budget and its access to sophisticated surveillance 
technologies is a ‘result of significant levels of international assistance’ (Privacy International 2017). We 
                                                      
14
 This is based on numbers from the Government of Pakistan, and on numbers from the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism. These numbers are neither fully reliable nor do they give a full picture, but they are indicative of the 
layout of violence in Pakistan. 
15
 See e.g. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (2014); Human Rights Watch (2011). 
16
 This is based on several years of reporting and 10 months of recent fieldwork around the southern province of 
Balochistan carried out by one of the authors, Mahvish Ahmad. 
17
 See e.g. Bytes For All (2017) and Bytes For All (2015).  
18
 See e.g. the case of Pakistan’s disappeared bloggers earlier this year (Hashim 2016). 
19
 For more information, see Dawn (2017). 
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argue that this expansion has engendered the conditions within which such extensive targeting is possible, 
to the detriment of marginalised, racialised, and dissident peoples and communities in Pakistan.  
 
The Importance of an ‘Imperial Turn’ 
 
Despite the extensive entanglements of the security and surveillance state with both colonial pasts and 
imperial presents outside imperial centers, and the concomitant ballooning of the surveillance and security 
state, we have almost no understanding of places like Pakistan. Above, we have given something akin to a 
laundry list of factors that indicate the importance of studying Pakistan. However, a laundry list is not the 
same as understanding a place. At best, the little research that exists assumes that the security and 
surveillance state is a bad carbon copy of its counterparts in the West. As a result, important sites of inquiry 
remain unaddressed, most importantly the ‘foreign policy’ and ‘foreign transfers’ of surveillance 
technologies in spreading ‘technologies of authoritarianism’ far beyond the borders of North America and 
Europe. 
 
To unpack how we can develop a more nuanced take on the place of transferred surveillance and security 
technologies in the ballooning of ‘technologies of authoritarianism’, we turn to Ann Stoler (2013, 2016). In 
her recent book, Imperial Duress, Stoler (2016: 4) argues that we must be careful in drawing out the 
‘connectivities joining colonial pasts to “postcolonial” presents’ and instead tease out the ‘less obvious 
ways’ that ‘colonial constraints and imperial dispositions have tenacious presence[s]’. She argues, instead, 
of the importance of paying attention to ‘what people are “left with”: to what remains, to the aftershocks of 
empire, to the material and social afterlife of structures, sensibilities, and things’ (2013: 9). Where she pays 
attention to the longue dureé—the temporal trajectories—through which ‘more protracted imperial 
processes that saturate the subsoil of people’s lives and persist, sometimes subjacently’—we argue for the 
importance of tracing imperial effects along contemporaneous, spatial trajectories. Like scholars who have 
mentioned events from distant colonial pasts and assumed that they reverberate through to the present 
merely through their mention, we argue that analyses of surveillance, security and the state in North America 
and Europe cannot fully account for how they operate in other places, further afield in, say, Pakistan. In 
fact, such an approach re-inscribes the centrality of North America and Europe not just in its turning away 
from the rest of the world, but its assumption that we can understand the state of security and surveillance 
in places like Pakistan because we understand them in the United States. In fact, it is precisely the lack of 
attention paid to places like Pakistan that has resulted in us making claims about such things as ‘global turns 
to authoritarianism’: the lives and memories of several hundreds and thousands of people killed in the run-
up to recent elections and referendums in the West bears no importance, no weight, in the debates that take 
place today. 
 
Of course, this is not akin to saying that empire has never been addressed within the field of Surveillance 
Studies. McCoy’s (2009) Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of 
the Surveillance State explores how the American colonial regime developed sophisticated police and 
intelligence units that eventually returned, to be applied, on the lives of marginalised, racialised and 
dissident populations in the United States. Likewise, scholars like Arun Kundnani and Deepa Kumar (2014) 
have long argued for the importance of paying attention to how race and empire have been co-constitutive 
of the surveillance state, such as in this quote by Kundnani: 
 
There is a constant flow in the history of the national security state between sites of colonial 
and neo-colonial conquest and sites of oppression within the United States. So we 
continuously see initiatives, and practices, and ideologies of surveillance that have emerged 
in the context of overseas empire coming back home to be used against radical movements 
in the United States, and visa versa. 
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Despite the excellent work that these, and other scholars,
20
 have carried out, however, North America and 
Europe remain central to most analyses of surveillance and security. While these scholars have effectively 
unpacked how surveillance is not ‘undifferentiated and universal’ (Gürses, Kundnani and Van Hoboken 
2016: 578-579) but rather mediated by prisms of race in the West, the same work has not been done to 
understand how surveillance and security transferred from the West to the rest of the world has fared. In 
other words, it has been more important to understand how imperial surveillance and security experiments 
have been ‘brought back’ to the West to be applied on marginalised, racialised and dissident populations ‘at 
home’, than see what they have ‘left behind’ in the countries where the experimentation first took place. 
This is not to say that empire has not been understood as an important corollary to racialised governance—
McCoy’s book and Kundnani’s quote above clearly make this argument—but it is to argue that the place of 
empire has not been fully unpacked. Despite the centrality of a country like Pakistan to the security agenda 
of the United States in the post-9/11 era, its position as the largest known recipient of NSA funding, and 
long-standing national security entanglements that have led to an expansion of the Pakistani security state 
into one of the largest in the world, there is almost no research into the place of surveillance in Pakistani 
state or society.
21
 
 
While we agree that security surveillance technologies travel between racialised populations ‘at home’ and 
empire ‘abroad’ we insist that we need more work to understand the ‘abroad’ part of this equation. In fact, 
attention to Pakistan throws up a host of new questions. These include, but are not limited to: how does the 
transference of surveillance technologies and the resultant explosion of the capacity of the security state to 
oversee its population shape and leave behind effects? How does the presence of not one, but multiple states, 
having access to the data of Pakistani citizens challenge our assumptions of the ‘on-looker’—and what do 
these multiple ‘on-lookers’ mean for organised political resistance in Pakistan against the ‘technologies of 
authoritarianism’ that surveillance and security technologies help entrench and expand? What does it mean 
when sophisticated surveillance technology transfers from abroad combine with formal and informal 
networks of mukhbirs, the Urdu word for collaborators or informers, and how does this fundamentally 
change surveillance at its point of effect? How are technologies of surveillance ‘left behind’ through foreign 
intervention used to police and regulate public spaces both offline and online, and how does it interact with 
policies around censorship in Pakistan? How do these surveillance technologies shape public space online 
and offline? How do they interact with conversations around free speech, rights, justice, racial profiling, 
torture, abductions, and other violence against marginalised communities in Pakistan? 
 
One of the more disconcerting consequences of this lacunae is the inadvertent assumption that the sort of 
political language suited for countering surveillance ‘at home’—a key part of our current political fight 
against authoritarianism—does not need to be re-adjusted when alliances are sought with surveilled, 
marginalised, racialised, and dissident populations abroad. In fact, in Pakistan, we face other challenges 
when it comes to political organising around the question of surveillance and authoritarianism, and they 
require us to ask different questions. For example: what does it mean to speak of ‘privacy’ in a place like 
Pakistan, where the individualised subject of Western liberal democracies does not exist, at least not in the 
same way? In a country where ‘race’ does not exist as a word in Urdu or any other spoken language in 
Pakistan, what does it mean to speak of racialised communities? What is the place of law and technical 
solutions like legal reform and encryption to questions of surveillance when most of those who are on the 
receiving end of the surveillance and security state have some of the lowest literacy rates in the world—and 
little to no access to courts? What is the place of such legal-technical fixes for some of Pakistan’s most 
vulnerable and targeted communities when they do not have the means to afford devices or equipment that 
can offer sophisticated digital cover? And, how do we make sense of the overlapping forms of 
                                                      
20
 See Simone Browne (2015), Dubrofsky and Magnet (2015), Mirzoeff (2011), Gürses, Kundnani, and Van Hoboken 
(2016). 
21
 A notable exception is Madiha Tahir and Sanaa Alimia’s work on security and surveillance of Pashtuns (see Tahir 
2017; Alimia 2015). Also see Maqsood (2016). 
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surveillance—not just from the state, but criminal groups, Islamists, militants, political groups, families—
that bleed into one another? 
 
If we do not attend to such questions, the unstated assumption, or unintended conclusion, that one can draw 
is that the place of surveillance in places like Pakistan is merely a shadow, or bad copy, of what is going on 
in Europe and North America, and that the political language of both counter-surveillance and anti-
authoritarianism can unproblematically be used in undifferentiated ways across the world. Our experience, 
in journalism, activism, and political organising within Pakistan, indicates that this is certainly not the case. 
Both of us—and many of our Pashtun, Baloch, dissident, journalist, writer, activist, organiser friends—have 
been subject to surveillance and harassment by, among other, the security state. Such stories must be taken 
seriously, rather than assumed to be similar to, or bad copies of, the experiences of targeted communities in 
the West. We find ourselves bereft of an internationalist political language that is used widely enough to 
communicate what it is that we have experienced, and what political battles we face. Neither the liberal 
language of rights, nor the left-wing language of western anti-imperialism, fully accommodates the political 
battles against an over-extended surveillance security state and society that has been implicit in the explosion 
of state and militant violence that we face in Pakistan. And, it certainly provides us with no internationalist 
languages that address the entrance of China into Pakistani politics. 
 
This is a call for an extension of Surveillance Studies to speak in more detail and with more reflection about 
the rest of the world—and a more nuanced and fine-grained understanding of ‘imperial effects’. It makes 
sense to excavate deeply sedimented imperial presences—alongside colonial histories that many 
postcolonial scholars attend to. Rather than focus on what returns to Europe and North America from its 
‘overseas’ adventures, we must turn to, in Stoler’s (2013) words, what is left behind, what people are left 
with, in places where these imperial adventures have taken place. 
 
 
References 
Alimia, Sanaa. 2015. ‘On Discrimination against Pashtuns: Reflections from Peshawar.’ Tanqeed | a magazine of politics and 
culture, Aug 2015. Accessed: 8 July 2017. http://www.tanqeed.org/2015/08/on-discrimination-against-pashtuns-
reflections-from-peshawar/. 
Asghar, Mohammad. 2017. ‘People of Fata-Origin Put under Surveillance in Pindi Division.’ Dawn.com. February 22. Accessed: 
17 July 2017. http://www.dawn.com/news/1316244. 
British High Commission Islamabad. 2017. ‘UK and Pakistan to Set up an Integrated Disease Surveillance System - GOV.UK.’ 
Accessed 11 June 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/uk-and-pakistan-to-set-up-an-integrated-
disease-surveillance-system. 
Browne, Simone. 2015. Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Bytes For All. 2015. ‘Leaked draft of Prevention of Electronic Crimes bill draconian and against principles of FoE and FoI.’ Bytes 
For All, 16 April 2016. Accessed: 8 July 2017. http://content.bytesforall.pk/node/165. 
Bytes For All. 2017. ‘Concerns come true as state criminalises pre-election dissent.’ Bytes For All, 25 May 2017. Accessed: 8 July 
2017. http://content.bytesforall.pk/node/216. 
Center for Global Development. 2014. ‘Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers.’ Accessed: 7 July 2014. https://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-
pakistan-numbers. 
Churchill, Winston. 1897. The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War. Library of Alexandria. 
Cox, Joseph. 2017. ‘British Companies Are Selling Advanced Spy Tech to Authoritarian Regimes—Motherboard.’ Accessed 11 
June 2017. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-uk-companies-exporting-interception-tech-around-the-world. 
Dawn. 2017. ‘Could it happen again? Remembering Pakistan’s Facebook, YouTube ban.’ Dawn.com. Accessed: 8 July 2017. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1320650. 
Dubrofsky, Rachel E., and Shoshana Amielle Magnet, eds. 2015. Feminist Surveillance Studies. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press. 
Greenwald, Glen. 2009. ‘What Are We After with Our Third Party Relationships—And What Do They Want from Us, Generally 
Speaking?’ National Security Agency slide, 15 September 2009. Accessed 17 July 2017. 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1084762/third-party-relationships.pdf. 
Guardian, The. 2010. ‘Sixty Years of US Aid to Pakistan.’ DataBlog: Facts are Sacred. Accessed: 7 July 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan. 
Gürses, Seda, Arun Kundnani, Joris Van Hoboken. 2016. ‘Crypto and Empire: The Contradictions of Counter-Surveillance.’ Media, 
Culture & Society. Accessed June 11. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0163443716643006. 
Ahmad and Mehmood: Surveillance, Authoritarianism and ‘Imperial Effects’ in Pakistan 
Surveillance & Society 15(3/4) 513 
Haider, Mateen. 2014. ‘PPP slams US spying, says violators owe an apology.’ Dawn, 2 July. Accessed: 7 July 2017. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1116565/ppp-slams-us-spying-says-violators-owe-an-apology. 
Hashim, Asad. 2016. ‘Disappeared: Silencing Pakistan’s Activists.’ Al Jazeera, 21 January. Accessed: 8 July 2017. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/01/disappeared-silencing-pakistan-activists-170121074139848.html. 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. 2014. ‘Killing of Missing Persons Appalling.’ Press Release, October 22. Accessed: 7 July 
2017. http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/killing-of-missing-persons-appalling-hrcp/. 
Human Rights Watch. 2011. ‘‘We Can Torture, Kill, or Keep You for Years’: Enforced Disappearances by Pakistan Security Forces 
in Balochistan.’ Accessed: 7 July 2017. https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/07/28/we-can-torture-kill-or-keep-you-
years/enforced-disappearances-pakistan-security. 
Husain, Khurram. 2017. ‘Exclusive: CPEC Master Plan Revealed.’ Dawn.com, May 14. Accessed: 17 July 2017. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1333101. 
Kundnani, Arun and Deepa Kumar. 2014. ‘Race, Surveillance and Empire: A Historical Overview.’ WeAreManyMedia. Accessed: 
17 July 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0CrsqII6las. 
McCoy, Alfred W. 2009. Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State. 
Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Maqsood, Ammara. 2016. ‘Mobility and Spatiality among Tribal Pashtuns. Tanqeed | a magazine of politics and culture, January. 
Accessed: 8 July 2017. http://www.tanqeed.org/2016/01/pashtuns-moving-across-space/. 
Rabia, Mehmood. 2017. ‘Pakistan’s Violent Cyberspace: No Place for Dissent.’ Al Jazeera, 16 January. Accessed: 8 July 2017. 
Mirzoeff, Nicholas. 2011. The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
News, Desk. 2017. ‘WikiLeaks Tweets Reminder That ‘US and UK Had Stolen NADRA Records.’’ The Express Tribune, June 7. 
Accessed: 17 July 2017. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1429538/wikileaks-tweets-reminder-us-uk-stolen-nadra-records/. 
Polio Global Eradication Initiative. ‘GPEI-Surveillance a Top Priority on Pakistan’s Mission to Eradicate Polio.’ 2017. Accessed 
11 June. http://polioeradication.org/news-post/surveillance-a-top-priority-on-pakistans-mission-to-eradicate-polio/. 
Privacy International. 2017. ‘Tipping the Scales: Security and Surveillance in Pakistan | Privacy International.’Accessed 11 June 
2017. https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/624. 
Stoler, Ann Laura, ed. 2013. Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination. Durham, NC; London: Duke University Press. 
Stoler, Ann Laura. 2016. Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times. Durham, NC: Duke University Press 
Tahir, Madiha. 2017. ‘The Ground Was Always in Play.’ Public Culture 29 (1 81): 5–16. doi:10.1215/08992363-3644373. 
US Embassy, Islamabad, Pakistan. July 20, 2009. ‘Secretary Napolitano discusses border security and passenger name record data 
sharing with GOP [Government of Pakistan] Officials.’ WikiLeaks. Accessed 7 July 2017. 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ISLAMABAD1642_a.html. 
  
